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February 1969] Notes 
MILITARY LAW-"ln Time of War" Under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice: 
An Elusive Standard 
841 
Clayton Anderson, Specalist Four, United States Army, absented 
himself from his unit without authority on November 3, 1964. Over 
two years later, he surrendered to civilian authorities who returned 
him to military control; Anderson was charged with desertion1 and 
convicted by a general court-martial.2 Because of the Government's 
failure to prove that Anderson intended to leave his unit perma-
nently, the board of review,3 on appeal, found him guilty of the 
lesser offense of unauthorized absence.4 But Anderson's case involved 
another issue. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 
an unauthorized absence in peacetime cannot be prosecuted if the 
offense was committed more than two years before the receipt of 
sworn charges and specifications by an officer exercising summary 
court-martial jurisdiction over the command.5 However, in time of 
war there is no applicable statute of limitation.6 The board of re-
view considered the effect of these provisions and determined that 
Anderson's offense was committed "in time of war" within the mean-
ing of the UCMJ;7 thus he could be tried and punished regardless 
1. The offense of desertion is defined by article 85 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 885 (1964). 
2. See United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.M.C.A. 589, 38 C.M.R. 386 (1968) (C.M. 
416,112). 
3. The extent of the board of review's authority is set out in article 66 of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1964). 
4. 38 C.M.R. 582 (1968). The offense of unauthorized absence is defined by article 
86 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 886 (1964). Any reviewing 
authority with power to approve or affirm a finding of guilty may approve or affirm, 
instead, so much of the finding as includes a lesser included offense. Uniform Code 
of Military Justice art. 59, 10 U.S.C. § 859 (1964). 
5. UCMJ art. 43(c), 10 U.S.C. § 843(c) (1964). The period of limitation prescribed 
by the article begins to run on the date the offender first absents himself without 
leave. !13 OP. ATTY. GEN. 121 (1922). 
6. UCMJ art. 4!1(a), 10 U.S.C. § 84!1(a) (1964) provides that: "A person charged 
with desertion or absence without leave in time of war, or with aiding the enemy, 
mutiny, or murder, may be tried and punished at any time without limitation." 
7. !18 C.M.R. 582 (1968). 
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of when he went "a.w.o.l." From the board of review, the case was 
appealed to the United States Court of Military Appeals.8 All three 
judges agreed that the United States was at war on November 3, 
1964; therefore, the court affirmed Anderson's conviction.9 
The consequences of this holding are profound. The Court of 
Military Appeals is the highest military court in the nation, and 
its decisions are binding on all other military courts. By holding 
that a state of war existed as of November 3, 1964-and presumably 
at all times since that date-the court has activated three groups of 
special provisions in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. First, as 
in Anderson, there are many offenses which can be prosecuted with-
out reference to statutes of limitation if they are committed in time of 
war. These offenses include absence without leave, desertion, aiding 
the enemy, mutiny, and murder.10 Moreover, if it is certified11 to 
the President that the trial in time of war of any offense will be 
detrimental to the prosecution of the war or inimical to national 
security, the prescribed period of limitation is extended until six 
months after the termination of hostilities.12 Finally, when the 
United States is at war, the running of the statute of limitations 
applicable to any UCMJ offense involving fraud or attempted fraud 
against the United States in connection with transfers and control 
of United States property or war-related contractual agreements is 
suspended until three years after the termination of hostilities.13 
The second major effect of determination that a state of war exists 
is upon the severity of penalties for certain offenses under the 
UCMJ; desertion,14 assaulting an officer,15 and misbehavior of a 
sentinel16 are all punishable by death only in wartime. In addition, 
misconduct as a prisoner17 and spying18 are punishable under the 
8. The United States Court of Military Appeals consists of three civilian judges 
appointed for a term of fifteen years by the President, with the advice and consent 
of the Senate. This court may prescribe its own rules of procedure. The review 
jurisdiction of the Court extends to: 
(1) all cases in which the sentence, as affirmed by a board of review, affects a 
general or flag officer or extends to death; 
(2) all cases reviewed by a board or review which the Judge Advocate General 
orders sent to the Court of Military Appeals for review; and 
(3) all cases reviewed by a board of review in which, upon petition of the ac-
cused and on good cause shown, the Court of Military Appeals has granted a 
review. 
UCMJ art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1964). 
9. United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 38 C.M.R. 386 (1968). 
10. UCMJ art. 43(a), 10 U.S.C. § 843(a) (1964). This provision is reproduced in 
note 6 supra. 
11. This certification must be performed by the Secretary of the appropriate 
branch of the armed services. UCMJ art. 43(e), 10 U.S.C. § 843(e) (1964). 
12. UCMJ art. 43(e), 10 U.S.C. § 843(e) (1964). 
13. UCMJ art. 43(f), 10 U.S.C. § 843(f) (1964). 
14. UCMJ art. 85(c), 10 U.S.C. § 885(c) (1964). 
15. UCMJ art. 90, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1964). 
16. UCMJ art. 113, 10 U.S.C. § 913 (1964). 
17. UCMJ art. 105, 10 U.S.C. § 905 (1964). 
18. UCMJ art. 106, 10 U.S.C. § 906 (1964). 
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UCMJ only during a state of war. Third, and perhaps most im-
portant, the existence of a state of war may extend military jurisdic-
tion over a significant number of civilians not otherwise subject to 
military control. The Uniform Code of Military Justice states that 
"[i]n time of war, persons serving with or accompanying an armed 
force in the field" are subject to its provisions.19 Although several 
Supreme Court decisions have curtailed the extension of military 
jurisdiction to civilians,20 these cases dealt with peacetime situations 
and presumably have had no effect upon previous decisions sustain-
ing military court-martial jurisdiction over civilians serving with 
or accompanying the armed forces in the field in time of war.21 
Therefore, the decision in the Anderson case apparently extends 
the application of military law to many American ci'1,lians in 
Vietnam who were not subject to such jurisdiction prior to Novem-
ber 3, 1964.22 Indeed, under previous decisions as to what con-
stitutes being "in the field,"23 military jurisdiction over civilians 
could extend to areas other than Vietnam. 
In Anderson, the three judges of the Court of Military Appeals 
were unable to agree on the grounds for their conclusion that a 
state of war exists.24 In light of this disagreement and the severe 
consequences resulting from a finding of the existence of "a state of 
war" for purposes of the UCMJ, it seems important to analyze the 
approaches employed by the individual judges to support their 
decisions. This Note will present such an analysis, investigate the 
deficiencies of the current language in the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, and suggest an alternative to the elusive standard that 
presently exists. 
19. UCMJ art. 2(10), IO U.S.C. § 802(10) (1964). 
20. Cases in which the Supreme Court has held that civilians are not subject to 
peacetime military jurisdiction include: McEiroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 
361 U.S. 281 (1960) (civilian government employee charged with noncapital felony); 
Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (civilian government employee charged with 
capital offense); Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (dependent charged with 
noncapital felony). See generally Ehrenhaft, Policing Civilians Accompanying the 
United States Armed Forces Overseas: Can United States Commissioners Fill the 
Jurisdictional Gap'!, 36 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 273 (1967); Bishop, Court-Martial Juris-
diction over Military-Civilian Hybrids, II2 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 317 (1964); Girard, The 
Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces-A 
Preliminary Analysis, 13 STAN. L. R.Ev. 461 (1961). 
21. Perlstein v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. granted, 327 U.S. 
777, cert. dismissed, 328 U.S. 822 (1946); Hammond v. Squier, 51 F. Supp. 227 (D.D.C. 
1943); In re Di Bartolo, 50 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). 
22. But see Wiener, Courts Martial for Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces 
in Vietnam, 54 A.B.A.J. 24 Uan. 1966). 
23. See McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1943) (a military voyage 
for the purpose of transporting army troops and supplies during war is a military 
expedition "in the field" within the meaning of a section relating to persons subject 
to military law); Hines v. Mikell, 259 F. 28 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 645 
(1919) (the phrase "in the field" is used in its military sense, and includes forces in 
cantonments and training camps within and without the United States). 
24. See notes 25-40 infra and accompanying text. 
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The board of review in Anderson based its conclusion that a 
state of war exists primarily on the ground that the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution,25 passed by Congress on August 10, 1964, constituted 
"official recognition" that the United States was engaged in an 
"overt confrontation of arms between opposing powers."26 Chief 
Judge Quinn, who wrote the Anderson opinion for the Court of 
Military Appeals, also accepted the language of the Resolution as a 
clear indication that Congress had recognized and declared "that 
the Gulf of Tonkin attack precipitated a state of armed conflict 
between the United States and North Vietnam."27 The opinion of 
Judge Quinn does not indicate why congressional recognition of a 
"state of armed conflict" was tantamount to recognition that the 
nation had entered a "time of war," or why it compelled such a con-
clusion by the court. He refused to accept the defendant's arguments 
that the Resolution merely reiterated the American responsibilities 
under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty28 and that it was 
not a determination that the United States was at war.29 Responding 
to these contentions, Judge Quinn stressed that the executive 
branch, through Under-Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzen-
bach, had characterized the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as "partici-
pation by Congress 'in the functional way . . . contemplated by 
the Founding Fathers' to 'invoke the ... war powers.' "3° Conceding 
that members of the administration do not always offer the definitive 
statement of congressional intent31 and that several members of the 
Senate disagreed with such a characterization of the Resolution,32 
25. Joint Resolution to promote the maintenance of international peace and 
security in southeast Asia, 78 Stat. 384 (1964). 
26. United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 589, 38 C.M.R. 386, 387 (1968). 
The language of the resolution acknowledges that American vessels had been attacked 
by the Communist regime in Vietnam and authorize the President to take whatever 
measures he deems necessary to assure the peace and security of that area. It does not, 
however, recognize an "overt confrontation of arms between opposing powers." 78 
Stat. 384 (1964). 
27. United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 589, 38 C.M.R. 386, 387 (1968). 
28. [1954] 6 U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170. 
29. Quinn also rejected the defense argument that the Gulf of Tonkin attack 
(against the destroyer U.S.S. Maddox on August 2, 1964, and two other United States 
destroyers on August 4, 1964) was an isolated incident insufficient to constitute a state 
of war. He deemed both the exact proportions of that attack and the nature of the 
United States response to it irrelevant to the state of war issue. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 
589-90, 38 C.M.R. at 387-88. Nor would he accept the argument that later North 
Vietnamese attacks on U.S. forces at Plieku (February 7, 1965), with the attendant re-
ciprocal forceful measures enlarging the conflict, created a new relationship which 
did not exist at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin attack. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 590, 38 
C.M.R. at 388. 
30. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 590, 38 C.M.R. at 388, quoting Hearings on S. Res. 151 Before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. on the United States Commitments to Foreign 
Powers, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 161-62 (1965). 
31. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 590, 38 C.M.R. at 388. See also note 56 infra. 
32. See Hearings, supra note 30, at 118-32; Hearings on the Gulf of Tonkin, The 
1961 Incidents, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 
81 (1966). 
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Judge Quinn nevertheless stated that "when a state of hostilities is 
expressly recognized by both Congress and the President, it is incum-
bent upon the judiciary to accept the consequences that attach to 
such recognition."33 Again, he equated congressional recognition of 
a "state of hostilities" with the "state of war" requirement that 
activates the sections of the UCMJ discussed above.34 
Judges Kilday and Ferguson disagreed with Judge Quinn about 
the meaning and effect of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Judge 
Kilday felt that the emphasis on the Resolution was misplaced since 
the existence of a state of war at any particular time is not neces-
sarily determined solely by congressional certification;35 to him, the 
Resolution represented only "a congressional appraisal of world 
happenings."36 It was not, according to Judge Kilday, the Resolu-
tion itself, but rather the events of which the Resolution took 
cognizance that were the real reasons why the United States was at 
war with North Vietnam in 1964. Citing authority for the proposi-
tion that war may exist without congressional declaration,37 Judge 
Kilday concluded that a state of war existed for "obvious reasons."38 
Judge Ferguson adopted a similar view of the Resolution. For him, 
however, it was unnecessary even to consider the Resolution, "either 
as a declaration of war ... or as evidence of existence of confl.ict."39 
He admitted that war had not been declared formally "in the Con-
stitutional sense," but, in an approach similar to the "obvious rea-
sons" rationale of Judge Kilday, he contended that "the fact remains 
that we are at war."40 At this point, it is also important to recognize 
that both of the concurring judges failed to specify the events or 
factors-or the manner of weighing such events or factors-which 
they relied upon to conclude that a state of war existed as of the 
fall of 1964. 
American courts seem never to have been able to agree on stan-
dards for determining the existence of a state of war. To a large 
extent, judicial definitions and standards apparently turn on the 
context in which the question arises. Thus, a situation deemed to 
activate the "in time of war" provisions in the UCMJ may not neces-
sarily preclude recovery by beneficiaries of life insurance policies 
which include clauses denying benefits when death is a result of 
war.41 Although the insurance cases generally deem a formal declara-
33. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 590, 38 C.M.R. at 388. 
34. See notes 5-19 supra and accompanying text. 
35. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 591, 38 C.M.R. at 389. 
36. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 594, 38 C.M.R. at 392. 
37. See notes 43.47 infra and accompanying text. 
38. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 593, 38 C.M.R. at 391. 
39. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 594, 38 C.M.R. at 392. 
40. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 594, 38 C.M.R. at 392. 
41. World War II; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 
1946) (congressional declaration not required); Pang v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 37 
Hawaii 208 (1945) (congressional declaration necessary); Rosenau v, Idaho Mut. Ben. 
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tion of war by Congress to be the event that the parties to an in-
surance contract intended to trigger such a clause, even in that 
limited area there is not complete agreement.42 
Outside the insurance litigation context, there is general agree-
ment that a state of war can exist without a formal declaration by 
Congress. As early as 1800, in a case arising out of American and 
French seizures of each other's ships, the Supreme Court found that 
the United States was at war without a formal declaration.43 Simi-
larly, the Texas Court of Appeals characterized the American inter-
vention in Mexico in 1918 as "war," even in the absence of con-
Assn., 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227 (1944) (congressional declaration necessary): West v. 
Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E.2d 475 (1943) (congressional declara-
tion required). 
Korea: Harding v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 270, 95 A.2d 221, cert. 
denied, 346 U.S. 812 (1953) (congressional declaration necessary); Beley v. Pennsylvania 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953) (con-
gressional declaration necessary); Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 
Texas 559, 261 S.W.2d 554 (1953) (congressional declaration not required). 
In recent years, insurance companies have avoided this problem by either substi-
tuting the phrase "during combat" or by specifically stating "acts of war, both de-
clared and undeclared" in the policy. 
42. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, several 
cases came before the courts in which the actual date of inception of the war became 
the sole issue of controversy. These cases concerned insurance contracts which con-
tained clauses that denied certain death benefits if death occurred as a result of war 
or any incident thereto. The insured in each case was killed in the December 7 
attack on Pearl Harbor. The insurers denied liability for the accidental death benefits 
on the ground that the war began on December 7, from the moment the attack com-
menced. The beneficiaries contended that there was no war until it was formally 
declared by Congress, which has sole constitutional authority to declare war. U.S. 
CONST., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10. Basing their authority on this provision of the Constitu-
tion, the majority of the courts in these cases held that the war, within the meaning of 
the insurance contract, did not exist until declared by Congress on December 8, 1941. 
See cases cited note 41 supra. 
The same issue arose during the conflict in Korea. The Supreme Court of Texas 
decided in Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Texas 559, 261 S.W.2d 554 
(1953), that an insured army officer who died in the crash of a military airplane in 
which he was traveling, under military orders, was not entitled to recover under the 
double indemnity provision of the policy because his death occurred in time of war. 
But again, not all courts were in agreement that the conflict constituted a war. For 
some courts, the lack of a congressional declaration was sufficient to remove the 
conflict from classification as a state of war, regardless of the intensity of hostilities 
there involved. See cases cited note 41 supra. 
43. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). Justice Moore, writing for the Court, 
asked, at 39, "by what other word the idea of the relative situation of America and 
France could be communicated, than by that of hostilities, or war?" Concurring, 
Justice Washington stated, at 42, that even without a declaration of war by Congress, 
"in fact and in law we are at war . . . ." 
However, the U.S. Court of Claims approximately eighty years later in several 
cases involving claims of those whose ships and goods had been destroyed or captured 
by the French stated: "We are ••. of the opinion that no such war existed as 
operated to abrogate treaties, to suspend private rights, or to authorize indiscriminate 
seizures ••• -that in short it was no public war, but a limited war in its nature similar 
to a prolonged series of reprisals." Gray, Admr. v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1886); 
see also Hooper, Admr. v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408 (1887). 
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gressional declaration.44 The use of American forces to protect 
citizens and representatives of this country in China during the 
Boxer Uprising again raised the issue of undeclared war. In Hamil-
ton v. McLaughry,45 a United States circuit court held that a formal 
declaration was unnecessary to the finding that a state of war existed; 
the court asserted that the judicial branch was bound by the deter-
mination of that issue by the political department of the govern-
ment.40 The court then stated that the increase of military pay for 
troops in China to wartime standards was sufficient recognition by a 
political department of the existence of war. 
Thus, even before the adoption of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, there was substantial authority for the proposition that 
a state of war may exist without a formal declaration by Congress. 
It may fairly be stated, however, that these cases provided neither a 
satisfactory definition of war47 nor workable standards by which its 
existence could be measured. 
In determining when the nation is "in time of war" for purposes 
of the UCMJ, the military courts generally have not tried to formu-
late a definition of war; rather, they have followed the civilian 
courts in basing their determination on practical considerations. The 
involvement of American forces in Korea provided the first oppor-
tunity for the United States Court of Military Appeals to consider 
the "state of war" language of the UCMJ. In United States v. Ban-
croft,48 the accused was convicted by special court-martial for sleep-
ing on post. The board of review found that a state of war existed 
in Korea at the time the offense was committed.49 Thus, it held that 
since the offense charged carried a possible death penalty during 
44. Arce v. Texas, 83 Tex. Crim. 292, 202 S.W. 951 (1818). Faced with the question 
whether a killing committed during the period when Pershing led the American 
Expeditionary Force into Mexico was murder because committed in peacetime, or not 
because committed in time of war, the court stated: "'While an invasion of Mexico 
••• was not a public war, or not preceded by a declaration of war against Mexico 
by the United States ••• it was technically and within the limited meaning of the 
word war." 83 Tc.x. Crim. at 295, 202 S."W. at 952. 
45. 136 F. 445 (C.C. Kan, 1905). 
46. 136 F. at 449. 
47. See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (1800) ("It may .•• be safely laid 
down, that every contention by force, in external matters, under the authority of 
their respective governments, is not only war, but public war.'). See also New York 
Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260, 264 (10th Cir. 1946). The doubtful relevance 
of these definitions of war to situations involving typical modern limited warfare, 
such as the Vietnam conflict in 1964, is obvious. Moreover, even if relevant, such 
definitions fail to take account of degrees of force which must be considered carefully 
if a line is to be drawn between war and peace. See, e.g., F. GROB, THE RELATIVITY OF 
WAR AND PEACE 283-89 (1949). 
48. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953); in two earlier cases, the court, without 
deciding the issue, accepted the stipulation of the parties that the Korean conflict con• 
stituted war. See United States v. Horner, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 478, 9 C.M.R. 108 (1953); 
United States v. Young, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 470, 9 C.M.R. 100 (1953). 
49. See United States v. Bancroft, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953). 
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wartime, 110 it was a capital case not within the jurisdiction of the 
special court-martial.151 The Court of Military Appeals unanimously 
affirmed. 52 
In its consideration of whether a state of war existed in Korea, 
the court indicated that it was irrelevant whether authorization for 
the United States military involvement came from Congress, the 
United Nations, or the President.53 It relied instead on the nature 
of the involvement itself. In support of its finding of a state of war 
it cited the movement and presence of large numbers of American 
military personnel on the battlefields in Korea, the large number 
of casualties, the large draft of recruits, the national emergency 
legislation, and the tremendous expenditures for operations in the 
Korean theater.54 Indeed, the court believed that "it would be an 
insult to the efforts of those servicemen who are daily risking their 
lives in defense of democratic principles to hold that peacetime con-
ditions prevail."55 
According to the court in Bancroft, it was the intent of Con-
gress56 in enacting the UCMJ that the phrase "in time of war" apply 
regardless of formal congressional declaration.57 This conclusion 
was especially appropriate, according to the court, since the primary 
effect of such a determination is to strengthen military discipline in 
the area of combat. Thus, when the President ordered the armed 
forces into the Korean conflict, "he involved this country in hostili-
ties to such an extent that a state of war existed."58 
50. UCMJ art. 113, IO U.S.C. § 913 (1964). 
51. See United States v. Bancroft, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, II C.M.R. 3 (1953). UCMJ art. 
19, IO U.S.C. § 819 (1964) withdraws jurisdiction from the special court-martial in 
such a case. 
52. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, II C.M.R. 3 (1953). 
53. 3 U.S.C.M.A. at 5, II C.M.R. at 5. 
54. 3 U.S.C.M.A. at 5-6, 11 CM.R. at 5-6 (1953). 
55. 3 U.S.C.M.A. at 6, II C.M.R. at 6 (1953). 
56. There is no discussion concerning the phrase "in time of war" in the committee 
hearings and reports of either the House of Representatives or the Senate. See H.R. 
REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S. REP. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); 
Hearings on H.R. 4080, Establishing a Uniform Code of Military Justice, Before the 
House Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. vol. 1 (1949). Likewise, there 
was no discussion of the phrase during congressional debate prior to passage. See 
95 CONG. R.Ec. 5718 (1949); 96 CONG. R.Ec. 1412 (1950). 
57. 3 U.S.C.M.A. at 6, II C.M.R. at 6; "when Congress used the phrase 'in time of 
war' in the military Code, it intended the phrase to apply to that state regardless of 
whether it was initiated or continued with or without a formal declaration." No 
authority was cited for this proposition. See note 56 supra. 
58. 3 U.S.C.M.A. at 6, II C.M.R. at 6 (1953). The court also relied on two other 
factors in support of its conclusion. First, Congress had not seen fit to narrow the 
scope of the "time of war" formula even though prior to the effective date of the 
UCMJ, the Judicial Council, in United States v. Gilbert, 9 BR-JC 183 (1950), had held 
that the Korean conflict constituted a state of war. Second, the court found support 
in congressional allowance of additional exclusions from gross income for federal tax 
purposes to officers and enlisted men serving "in a combat zone." 26 U.S.C. 322(b}(B) 
(1964). Pursuant to this section, the President had designated Korea and the sur-
rounding waters as a combat area. Exec. Order No. 10,195, 15 Fed. Reg. 9177 (1950), 
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In keeping with the emphasis in Bancroft on the practical im-
portance of military discipline in wartime, the Court of Military 
Appeals, in United States v. Ayers,59 held that the provisions im-
posing stricter discipline in wartime were also applicable to offenses 
committed in the United States during the Korean fighting. In 
Ayers, on facts similar to those in Anderson, the court noted that 
whether defection occurs at a port of embarkation on the eve of a 
shipment of personnel or after a unit's arrival in the theatre of 
conflict, the gravity of the offense-and the need for discipline-
remain the same. 00 
Finally, the Court of Military Appeals was faced with the ques-
tion of whether and when the state of war engendered by the Korean 
conflict had come to an end. Consistent with its prior reliance on 
"practicality" and "reality," the court in United States v. Shell61 
found a significant change in the conditions upon which it had 
predicated its prior holdings; therefore, it held that the state of war 
had ended. Specifically, the court in Shell relied upon the complete 
cessation of all armed conflict in Korea,62 establishment of a de-
militarized zone, the repatriation of war prisoners, and the change 
of American strategy in Korea from repelling aggression to main-
taining the status quo.63 However, it is significant to note that the 
date chosen by the court as marking the end of the state of war was 
in fact the date of the signing of the Korean Armistice. 64 
It is apparent that the approach now taken by the military 
courts to the "in time of war" formulation in the UCMJ is subject 
to serious criticism. While perhaps workable in the clear cases in 
which war has been formally declared, it becomes, in the context of 
modern conflict, an extremely indefinite standard. In the increas-
ingly likely "tough" cases-in which there has been no formal 
declaration, casualties occur but not extensively, troops are com-
mitted but not approaching full capacity, expenditures are high 
but not high enough to burden the national economy, and in which 
the nature of the fighting deviates substantially from traditional 
wartime practice-it is doubtful that the "practical" approach 
adopted by the court in Anderson will lead to consistent or mean-
ingful results. 
For many reasons, the executive and legislative branches of the 
government are increasingly reluctant to declare or recognize the 
existence of war.65 Accepting the proposition that in times and areas 
59. 4 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 15 C.M.R. 220 (1954). 
60. 4 U.S.C.M.A. at 225, 15 C.M.R. at 225 (1954). 
61. 7 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 2!1 C.M.R. llO (1957). 
62. According to the court, this was a factor of "crucial importance" in all previous 
cases in which a state of war was found to exist. 7 U.S.C.M.A. at 651, 23 C.M.R. at ll5. 
63. 7 U.S.C.M.A. at 651, 23 C.M.R. at ll5. 
64. 7 U.S.C.M.A. at 651, 23 C.M.R. at ll5. 
65. To some extent this is a result of efforts in the international community to 
outlaw war as an acceptable means of implementing national policy and the desire 
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of conflict the military has a need for stronger disciplinary measures 
to prosecute its objectives efficiently, the present ad hoc method of 
concluding that the nation is "in time of war" is hardly conducive to 
more effective discipline in the zone of combat. It seems to be ask-
ing too much of the military personnel serving in those zones to 
require them to make an accurate assessment of the factors that a 
court may later rely on in finding a state of war. If three judges on 
the highest military court are unable to agree even upon the factors 
to be considered, it is unlikely that servicemen and related per-
sonnel will conclude that the stronger measures are in force unless 
and until a case has been prosecuted and decided and knowledge of 
that decision has reached them. Thus, it is at least questionable, 
under the present formulation, whether the UCMJ provisions can 
be effective in accomplishing their major objective-strengthening 
military discipline in the combat zone. 
But an even more forceful objection to the present UC:MJ pro-
visions employing the "in time of war" standard can be made; it 
seems that there are the serious due process questions posed by 
these provisions and their present interpretation. It is well settled 
that "a law forbidding or requiring conduct in terms so vague that 
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning 
and differ as to its application violates due process of law.''66 "While 
the conduct proscribed by these provisions is presumably specified 
clearly enough, the standards by which different sets of penalties 
may be imposed are so vague that it is at least arguable that service-
men prosecuted under these provisions are not afforded the ade-
quate notice to which they are entitled by fifth amendment's due 
process guarantee. Although application of the vagueness concept 
to the special penalty and statute of limitation provisions of the 
UCMJ admittedly involves an extension of present precedent,G7 the 
question of whether military jurisdiction extends to civilians serv-
not to interrupt treaty arrangements which may be suspended or modified with the 
existence of a state of war. See, e.g., Layton, The Effect of .Measures Short of War on 
Treaties, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 96 (1962). 
66. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 364 (1964). See also United States v. Cardiff, 
344 U.S. 174 (1952); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Connally v. General 
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). Cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); 
Graccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966). 
67. The usual situation involves a statute which describes an offense in tem1s that 
are so indefinite that an individual would be unable to determine what kind of con• 
duct is supposed to be prohibited. See text accompanying note 66 supra; Dombrowski 
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (statutory definition of "subversive organization" in 
a criminal statute proscribing various forms of participation in such organizations 
held unconstitutional for vagueness). It would seem that the closest precedent to the 
problem described in this Note is United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952). In 
that case, the Court struck down the conviction of a factory manager who refused 
to permit inspection by federal officials. The Court held that the provision of the 
Federal Food and Drug Act prohibiting such refusal was too vague to inform the 
manager that he was liable for prosecution if he refused to consent to inspection. 
February 1969] Notes 851 
ing with the military is keyed to the same "in time of war" stan-
dard.68 For a civilian serving with the armed forces, this standard 
determines whether or not he is subject to the provisions of the 
UCMJ; thus, the traditional authority on unconstitutional vague-
ness should apply to at least this situation.69 
Third, the present "time of war" formula does not admit of the 
flexibility required of workable standards in this area. Once a state 
of war has been deemed to exist, American servicemen all over the 
world become subject to the harsher disciplinary measures. The 
UCMJ does not permit geographical limits of application. The Ander-
son case is an apt illustration, as the defendant absented himself 
from a Louisiana base far removed from the area of conflict in 
Southeast Asia. Recognition of some geographic flexibility would re-
sult in a more satisfactory solution to the problems of adequate 
notice and better discipline. 
In order to establish fair and workable standards in this area of 
military law, it is essential to recognize the sometimes competing 
goals of the political and practical realities of modem day armed 
conflict, the need for stricter penalties and more summary pro-
cedures for greater control and better discipline in the military in 
combat zones, and the desirability of providing military personnel 
and others serving with them adequate notice of the imposi-
tion of stricter disciplinary controls. Further manipulation of the 
"in time of war" standard now found in the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice is unnecessary and unprofitable. Rather, it would 
be more effective to remove the source of ambiguity from the UCMJ 
by omitting the phrase "in time of war" and substituting a more 
precise criterion. 
The UCMJ itself suggests an alternative that could accomplish 
the objectives discussed above. Congress, in the exercise of its power 
to regulate the armed forces,70 provided in the UCMJ that the punish-
ment which a court-martial may impose for an offense could not 
exceed the limits prescribed by the President.71 Pursuant to this 
provision, the President by executive order has established maxi-
mum limits of punishment.72 The executive order also provides that 
immediately upon formal declaration of war the offenses punishable 
by death in time of war are to be so punishable until formal termi-
nation of that war or until further executive order prior to formal 
termination. 73 
68. See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text. 
69. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 
!160 (1964); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
306 U.S. 451 (1939). 
70. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8. 
71. UCMJ art. 56, IO U.S.C. § 856 (1964). 
72. Exec. Order No. 10214, 3 C.F.R. 408 (1949-53 comp.). 
73. MANUAL FOR COURTS·MARTIAL 217 (1951). 
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This delegation of authority to the President serves to insure 
a minimum degree of uniformity in punishment application, to 
provide notice to military personnel of the maximum penalties 
they face for violations of the UCMJ, and to strengthen military 
discipline by adjusting the severity of penalties according to the 
seriousness of the offenses. Congress could have left the decision 
about all penalties for UCMJ offenses-including death-completely 
to the discretion of the President, provided that sufficient general 
criteria were given within which the President might exercise that 
discretion.74 
Since the "in time of war" provisions of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice were designed to meet the exigencies of that oc-
casion,75 it seems reasonable for Congress to direct that when any 
situation exists in which the President, as Commander-in-Chief, 
determines that increased military discipline is required for efficient 
control of the armed forces, he may by executive order impose all 
provisions of the UCMJ which currently are invoked only "in time 
of war." The UCMJ could provide that the executive order would 
remain in effect until revoked by subsequent order or by congres-
sional resolution.76 A companion provision could provide that 
formal declaration of war by Congress also would activate the same 
special provisions. 
These changes in the UCMJ would answer many of the objec-
tions to the present formula. First, in cases like Anderson, it would 
eliminate the need for a judicial determination of the existence of 
war when there has not been a formal declaration. The elusive 
standard now used for such judicial conclusions could be discarded. 
Second, the military's need to insure discipline during combat and 
comparable situations short of declared war would be satisfied by 
presidential determination that such a need in fact exists. Third, 
the due process requirement of adequate notice would be satisfied. 
Servicemen and related personnel would receive notice that the 
increased penalties were in effect and that the jurisdiction of the 
74. See Ehmke, "Delegata Potestes Non Potest Delegari," A Maxim of American 
Constitutional Law, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 50 (1961); Rossman, The Spirit of Laws: The 
Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 35 A.B.A.J. 93 (1949); Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation 
of Legislative Power, 47 CoLUM. L. REv. 359, 561 (1947). 
75. Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before the House Armed Services Comm., 81st Cong., 
1st Sess. (1949). 
76. Cf. the procedure followed under the Atomic Energy Commission Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2153 (1964), requiring presidential approval of cooperation with any nation 
or regional defense organization in the atomic energy field. The statute provides 
that the proposed agreement, together with the presidential approval, must be sub-
mitted to Congress, which then has sixty days to pass a resolution disfavoring the 
agreement. However, in the military law context, this procedure would be inadequate 
because of the delay that it entails. It also would force Congress to make a decision 
at a time when it might be politically wise for the national legislature to refrain 
from taking any official :position, 
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UCMJ had been imposed through the issuance of an executive 
order. Fourth, the exigencies of limited warfare could be better 
accommodated, both geographically and militarily, by issuance of 
an executive order enumerating changes in selected provisions of 
the UC1"1J or directed to particular geographic areas in accordance 
with the specific need. Fifth, since political considerations might 
dictate that war should not be recognized either formally or in-
formally, permitting an executive order to issue on standards other 
than the existence of war would provide an expedient method to 
impose the current wartime provisions of the UCMJ without risk 
of diplomatic embarrassment. 
